



Seed Cotton Market Structure and Cotton Sector Performance:  
Many Lessons but No Fixed Prescriptions 
 




INTRODUCTION: The African continent offers a 
wide diversity of approaches to cotton sector 
organization. This has led to recurrent debates about 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of different 
forms of organization. Experience has shown that the 
structure of the markets in which farmers sell their 
seed cotton has a strong influence on how other 
activities in the sector are organized (e.g., input 
supply, credit, export marketing) and how well the 
entire sector performs. Many factors can differentiate 
seed cotton markets, but the most important are: 
 Number of actors: competitive systems have many 
actors, oligopolistic systems just a few, and 
monopolistic systems just one.  
 Degree of vertical integration: the greater the 
number of different functions a single firm 
performs (e.g., input supply, ginning, exporting), 
the more vertically integrated that firm is. 
 Degree of government involvement: this can range 
from direct ownership and management of the 
cotton company to nothing more than providing a 




As we will see in the discussion below, there is often 
a pattern in the way that these organizational 
characteristics are grouped together. For example, 
vertical integration (which can significantly reduce 
transaction costs involved in moving goods and 
services from producers to consumers) is difficult to 
maintain in a competitive market with many actors. 
Consequently, we tend to find vertical integration 
associated primarily with monopolies, to a lesser but 
still strong degree with oligopolies, and hardly at all 
with competitively structured systems. While vertical 
integration facilitates good performance in some 
dimensions, it can undermine it in others; in other 
words, there are tradeoffs in performance associated 
with particular structural choices. These tradeoffs 
need to be understood and evaluated during any 
cotton sector reform process. The objective of this 
brief is to describe some of these trade offs, noting 
from the start that  there is no “ideal” cotton sector 
structure—this is perhaps the most important finding 
reported in this brief. 
This Policy Brief summarizes evidence reported in a recent study on the links between seed cotton market structures 
and selected cotton sector performance indicators in nine African countries (Tschirley et al. 2008).  The purpose of the 
study is to contribute to better design and implementation of cotton sector reforms by building a reliable, broad 
assessment of cotton sector performance from detailed empirical information collected and analyzed by independent 
researchers and cotton sector experts.  
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The four most common seed cotton marketing 
structures in Africa are:  
 national monopolies,  
 local monopolies,  
 concentrated market-based sectors, and  
 competitive market-based sectors.  
 
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF 
AFRICAN SEED COTTON MARKETS: Of the 
four dominant market structures in Africa, two are 
forms of monopoly that allow for seed cotton prices 
to be determined administratively, with varying 
degrees of correspondence to prevailing world 
market prices. 
National monopolies are best characterized by the 
West and Central African  (WCA) filière integrée 
model which has a single public ginning company 
with exclusive rights to purchase seed cotton, 
producer prices that are announced at planting and 
fixed over time and space, intensive input use 
supported by vertically integrated input credit and 
output markets that ensure credit repayment, direct 
cotton sector investments in feeder roads, adult 
literacy, research and extension, and a stabilization 
fund. Mali, Cameroon, Senegal and Chad continue 
to operate national monopolies, although 
government has a more limited role in Cameroon 
and Senegal (where cotton is a less strategic 
economic sector) than in Mali and Chad.
1 Although 
Benin started out as a national monopoly, it began 
transitioning to a hybrid system in 1999. At 
present, the parastatal SONAPRA manages 50% of 
the seed cotton market with approximately ten 
other local firms sharing the rest in an environment 
of strong government involvement that limits 
competition by setting prices and assigning 
purchasing quotas to each firm. 
Local monopolies are best characterized by the 
concession system in Mozambique, with the cotton 
sector divided into multiple geographic areas in 
which government grants a monopoly position to a 
single firm. In Mozambique, a national minimum 
price is announced shortly before harvest. Firms are 
protected against side-selling (which if left 
unchecked would destabilize input credit systems) 
through enforcement of the regional monopoly. 
Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso broke their national 
monopolies into regional monopolies and Mali is 
moving in this direction. Price mechanisms in the 
local      monopolies    of     WCA      differ     from 
                                                 
1 In August 2008, Mali passed legislation to privatize the sector, 
but this has not yet been implemented. 
the Mozambique model, in that they have retained 
the traditional system of announcing prices at 
planting time, with a premium paid at a later date if 
the income of the ginning/export firm exceeds 
anticipated margins. Farmers’ organizations are 
now involved in price negotiations in WCA, but 
have until recently played a very minor role in 
Mozambique where the cotton companies have 
historically set prices in consultation only with 
government. Also, the WCA filière integrée 
systems have continued efforts to maintain 
stabilization funds. Most of these funds were 
depleted during the recent past due to cost 
inefficiency and maintenance of high producer 
prices in the face of extended periods of low world 
prices; but efforts are underway to rebuild them.
2 
The other two dominant models are market-based 
structures where prices are determined predominantly 
by market forces and allowed to change over space 
and time during a single season. 
Concentrated, market-based sectors were best 
represented, until recent times, by Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, where one or two large companies 
compete for the purchase of seed cotton with a few 
much smaller firms. Although prices are 
determined in the market and may vary by location, 
a dominant firm acts as a price-leader announcing 
indicative (but not legally binding) prices at 
planting. Prices can change during the season 
(more common in Zimbabwe than in Zambia). 
Although the possibility of prices changing forces 
farmers to bear some market risk, the exporting 
firms reduce the need to change prices through the 
use of forward selling and futures markets. There 
are no stabilization funds for the concentrated 
markets. The larger ginners in concentrated 
markets tend to be vertically integrated into farmer 
support services; this service provision is weaker 
for the small ginners. 
Competitive, market-based sectors are best 
illustrated by the current Tanzania model, 
characterized by many competing firms (of which a 
few are farmer cooperatives); none have a 
dominant position. There is some limited vertical 
integration as most seed cotton purchasers own the 
gins they operate. Gins used in Tanzaniua have 
historically been roller gins, which do not exhibit 
significant economies of scale—a contributing 
factor to the evolution of a more competitively 
structured sector. Prices are determined by the 
                                                 
2 Burkina, has announced the establishment of a new stabilization 
fund to become operational with the 2009/2010 production 
season.    3
market and vary over space and time; there is no 
stabilization fund to protect ginners or producers 
against price risks and firms provide farmer support 
services rarely if at all.
 3 
WHAT IS THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON 
PERFORMANCE?  Performance is multi-
dimensional, yet there are nine performance criteria 
that are most critical for assessing overall cotton 
sector performance. These criteria and the indicators 
(shown in parentheses) used to measure them are 
listed below: 
 Producer price levels (producer price as a share of 
the export price); a higher share is considered a 
sign of a “farmer-friendly” sector that will 
stimulate increased production and farm incomes;  
 The level of net farm returns (net returns per day 
of family labor); higher net returns signal a 
favorable cost/price environment for farmers; 
 How well input supply and credit systems function 
(percent of cotton farmers receiving credit and the 
repayment rate); access to inputs and sustainable 
credit systems contribute to increased yields; 
 Research investments (number of new varieties 
released and adopted during the past ten 
years);research contributes to yield-increasing or 
cost-reducing production techniques;  
 Cotton yields (mean yield over 5 years and yield 
trends over 10 years); yields are a function of input 
supply as well as research, extension, and other 
farmer support services; 
 The quality of the cotton lint produced by ginners 
(estimated average realized premium over Index A 
world price); quality determines the price obtained 
in world markets and ultimately the price that can 
be offered to farmers; 
 The cost-efficiency of post-farm operations (cost of 
moving and processing a kilogram of lint from 
farm gate to the point of being loaded on a truck 
for export); this determines what share of world 
market prices can be offered to farmers; 
 The amount of value added contributed by the 
sector to the overall economy (total cotton value 
added per capita); a measure of how much the 
sector contributes to overall economic growth and 
job creation; and 
 The  macroeconomic impacts of the sector (net 
budgetary contribution per capita calculated as 
taxes paid minus transfers received plus 
shareholder returns). 
                                                 
3The Ugandan system was also built on roller gins and was 
competitively structured until 2000, when government and 
ginners decided to convert it to a hybrid system based on zoning 
that is similar to a local monopoly.  
Using these nine criteria, researchers evaluated and 
ranked the performance of the four structural models 
described above.
4 Key findings are summarized in 
Table 1 (page 6) and described in the following 
paragraphs. 
NATIONAL MONOPOLIES: (Mali and 
Cameroon) have not yet undertaken major structural 
reforms such as privatization of ginning. On the other 
hand, they have increased producer roles and 
responsibilities for input distribution and seed cotton 
assembly, which means a larger share of export 
profits for farmers. Governments have also held 
cotton companies responsible for meeting production 
and performance goals through management 
contracts; but the contract system has failed to 
resolve many of the problems. The national 
monopolies have good performance relative to other 
structural models in input credit provision (largely 
because the single buyer in the seed cotton market is 
able to ensure credit repayment) and yields (generally 
a reflection of the system’s ability to supply inputs 
and extension services and promote animal traction 
among a large share of farmers). Absolute yields for 
national monopolies have, however, been declining 
as farmers move toward more extensive production 
practices using lower levels of purchased inputs and 
cultivating more land. The picture on net returns has 
been variable over time. Poor net returns in the early 
post-devaluation period—where the benefits of the 
devaluation and rising market prices were not passed 
through to farmers—were a major bone of contention 
in Mali that led to production boycotts. More 
recently, however, prices in both Mali and Cameroon 
have been well above what can be justified by world 
market prices, contributing to high net returns at the 
farm level. These recent net returns cannot be viewed 
as a sustainable strength, given that they have 
depleted the price stabilization fund in both Mali and 
Cameroon and required a government bail out in 
Mali. A particularly weak area of performance is the 
post-harvest transport, handling, and processing, 
which is not cost-efficient compared to other 
structural models (see Figure 1, page 6). 
Macroeconomic contribution has been acceptable on 
average, but variable from year to year, depending on 
whether the sector requires government support 
payments or produces tax revenues. At present, for 
                                                 
4 Indicators used in this study are not without their critics. For 
example, lint quality is used as an indicator of ginning 
performance but is also a function of cotton varieties and 
production conditions (which vary across countries) and the 
introduction of a larger number of varieties during a ten-year 
period could signal poor research performance (i.e., a need to 
replace non-performing varieties) rather than successful research 
investments.    4
example, the Malian system is dealing with large and 
negative macroeconomic impacts, but has 
experienced many years of positive impacts in the 
past. National monopoly performance is variable with 
respect to producer prices, lint quality, research, and 
value added.  
The picture for local monopolies (Mozambique and 
Burkina Faso) is variable, due primarily to the vastly 
differing histories of the two countries: Burkina has 
only recently emerged from its national monopoly 
system. The ex-parastatal still had 85% of the market 
as of 2007, so in many respects it resembles the 
national monopoly that it was a short time ago. 
Because of these differences, we report separately on 
each of these countries in the table. Mozambique 
shows no areas of best performance and two areas—
producer prices and farm returns—with poorest 
performance. Input credit supply in Mozambique is 
acceptable, though inferior to that in Burkina Faso. 
Credit repayment in Mozambique varies from 60% to 
90%, with the lowest rates occurring in zones where 
new firms are poorly regulated by government, 
making it possible for side-selling to take place 
during some years. Burkina exhibits a strong input 
credit system with 95% repayment based on the 
filière integrée approach that is now applied within 
the local monopoly system. Based on strong input 
credit and other carryovers from its national 
monopoly system, it also performs very well on farm 
yields and value added; like the national monopolies, 
though, its high farm returns are not fully sustainable 
due to unrealistically high farm prices Macro-
economic impact is acceptable for Mozambique, in 
large part because government is collecting taxes and 
not getting involved in bailouts. In Burkina Faso, 
however, large sectoral deficits in recent years have 
created major budgetary problems.  Producer prices 
are extremely low in Mozambique due to poor 
regulation of the sector but relatively high in Burkina 
where producer organizations have been able to 
negotiate what many consider unsustainably high 
prices. 
The  concentrated market-based systems (Zambia 
and Zimbabwe) show the best overall picture: best 
performance in lint quality, macroeconomic impact, 
and value added, acceptable on several other 
indicators, and poorest on none. These countries’ 
performance on value added is superior to Tanzania’s 
competitive sector but below Burkina’s best 
performance. Good performance on lint quality (see 
Figure 2, page 6) stems from two factors: the ability 
of firms to pay more for better quality, and the ability 
of the dominant firms to develop relatively stable 
relationships with farmers willing to produce high 
quality cotton. Both these abilities emerge from the 
modest risk of credit default (compared to 
competitively structured systems). The concentrated 
systems also perform acceptably for input and credit 
supply, post-farm cost efficiency, farm yields, and 
farm returns. There is evidence, however, of a 
weakness in these systems because they can evolve 
into competitive systems with many small, under-
capitalized actors before the institutions for managing 
input supply and credit have developed in the general 
economy. When this happens, the performance of the 
input/credit system deteriorates due to side-selling 
and reduced repayment rates, as illustrated by 
Zimbabwe where between 2002 and 2006, the 
number of firms expanded from 3 or 4 to over 15 and 
repayment rates declined significantly. Zambia 
overcame similar problems in the late 1990s when 
the lead firms refined their service provision and 
credit recovery approach (including educating 
farmers about the benefits of remaining loyal); but 
side selling and credit defaults were on the rise again 
in 2006. Results are variable over time for producer 
prices and research. Producer prices as a share of 
export price in both Zambia and Zimbabwe were 
second only to Tanzania and Uganda during the 
1995-2000 period, but were lower than those of all 
other countries except Mozambique from 2000 to 
2005.  
Competitive Systems: (Tanzania and, prior to 2000, 
Uganda) are subject to weak performance in input 
supply and credit, farm yields, and lint quality (all 
functions that benefit from vertical or horizontal 
coordination that is not adequately developed in 
competitive systems). Input credit supply is 
particularly weak in competitive systems because 
those supplying such services are unable to ensure 
repayment when farmers decide to sell their output to 
competitors who have not provided credit. By 
contrast, these systems do well in prices offered to 
producers and cost-efficiency in post-harvest 
operations. From 1995-2005 farmers in Uganda and 
Tanzania consistently received 68-70% of the export 
price with little inter-annual variation; this was the 
highest average share of the export price realized by 
countries in the study. 
DOES PAST EXPERIENCE PROVIDE 
GUIDANCE FOR IMPROVING REFORM 
OUTCOMES AND STRATEGIES? Yes, but it 
does not provide fixed prescriptions!  Experience 
shows that (1) there is no single prescription for 
successful cotton sector organization; (2) the search 
for improved performance should be based on a 
dynamic view of structure that permits change over 
time; and (3) different seed cotton market structures   5
impose different sets of challenges that can often be 
predicted and addressed during the reform process.   
The primary needs in countries with national 
monopolies (much of Francophone WCA) include 
developing safeguards against political influence, 
improving transparency in operations and budgetary 
matters, and increasing post-harvest cost efficiency.  
Cameroon appears to have separated the government 
interests from the economic interests of the sector 
more effectively than other countries, offering an 
example to study. In the absence of such separation, 
more drastic structural reform may be needed. The 
danger with such reform is that it could result in a 
rapid transition to a concentrated market-based 
system without appropriate safeguards to limit new 
entrants to firms willing and able to invest in farmer 
support programs and pass benefits of devaluations 
and quality improvements through to farmers; this 
could lead to the post-2000 situation in Zimbabwe 
and Zambia where the rise of many small actors has 
jeopardized input credit systems. Gradually 
transitioning to a concentrated system via local 
monopolies may provide the time needed for building 
supporting institutions for credit and contract 
enforcement. Reducing post-farm costs could be done 
without transitioning to a fully competitive system if 
the national monopoly increased private-sector 
involvement and price competition in handling, 
transport, ginning, and processing of cotton seed and 
oil by-products. 
If one is already in a competitive system, extra 
attention needs to be given to developing institutions 
and coordinating mechanisms to support input credit 
as well as to provide incentives for the production of 
higher quality lint.  This includes strengthening of 
regulatory bodies charged with monitoring ginner 
and producer behavior as well as incentives that 
encourage investments in more productive 
technologies (fertilizers, appropriate varieties, high 
volume instrument equipment). While government 
has a role to play in research and regulation, 
professional associations (ginners, producers, traders) 
need to be involved in determining the needs and 
providing some self-monitoring. Successful 
development of joint public-private programs to 
improve the weak links (particularly input supply and 
credit) could contribute to increased productivity for 
the entire sector. 
In Africa’s current institutional and market setting, 
competitively structured systems are unlikely to 
support productivity growth and poverty reduction.   
Promotion of a competitive seed cotton market makes 
sense only when there has been progress in 
developing national input supply and credit systems 
and an adequate regulatory framework. 
Drawing firm conclusions about the performance and 
role of local monopolies is difficult given that the two 
examples presented differ as a result of historical 
circumstances. Analysts suggest that the model be 
used as a stepping stone from national monopoly to 
one of the more market-based structures rather than 
as a durable arrangement. This requires developing a 
transition plan to advance beyond the local monopoly 
at the time the local monopolies are established. In 
the absence of a transition plan, the sector may tend 
to stagnate and fail to realize its potential.  In the 
short-run, the success of a local monopoly will 
depend on clear rules for the initial allocation of 
concessions as well as for evaluation and re-issuance 
of subsequent concessions, successful regulation in 
terms of price setting rules, and capacity building 
among key actors (farmers, input suppliers, and 
government personnel managing the concession 
grants). The Mozambique government has recently 
evaluated the concession model and decided to 
terminate and re-negotiate all existing concessions, 
for periods of five to ten years, with a view to 
eventual liberalization of the sector. 
Evidence suggests that the concentrated market-
based structure has outperformed other structures in 
the recent past. To diminish the risk of a rapid 
transition to a highly competitive sector characterized 
by weak input supply and credit and poor lint quality, 
special attention needs to be given to licensing rules 
that specify capabilities and conduct of firms wishing 
to enter the sector. At the same time, stakeholders 
should be pursuing complementary programs to 
develop national input and credit markets and lint 
quality monitoring systems. There is also a need to 
monitor prices and ensure that all actors in the sector 
are receiving an equitable return on their efforts. 
Strengthening producer organizations and their 
bargaining skills is usually a more effective long-
term strategy for ensuring an equitable distribution of 
benefits than instituting government price setting 
regulations and building a costly bureaucracy. 
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 Table 1. Comparison of Performance Results for Four Predominant Seed Cotton Market Structures in Africa 
Source: Complied by authors from study results reported in Tschirley et al. forthcoming. 
Note: Because the two examples of local monopolies have very different performance results due to their different historical situations, we show the results for each individual 
country rather than combining them. 
 
   
















































Competitive Tanzania  Best  Acceptable  Poorest Variable Poorest  Poorest  Best  Acceptable  Acceptable 
Concentrated 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe  Variable over time  Acceptable  Acceptable Variable Acceptable  Best  Acceptable  Very good  Best 
Mozambique  Poorest  Poorest 
Variable across 
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Burkina Faso  Variable over time 
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Cameroon  Variable over time 
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Variable over 
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